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“GREEN CONFUSION”: EVOLUTION
AND ENTANGLEMENT IN H. G. WELLS’S
THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU
Evolution and Entanglement in H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau
By John Glendening
THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU (1896) is a richly confused novel, and its complexities
and mixed agendas constitute one reason why this remarkable enactment of ideas and
theories has received so much, and such varied, critical attention. Its generic, psycho-
logical, and thematic disorder does not stand out as much as it might, however, because
confusion itself — biological, ethical, epistemological — is one of its subjects.1 Further-
more, the text begins with great and misleading attention to accuracy, precision, and
narrative control. First, Charles Edward Prendick introduces the manuscript of his now
deceased uncle, Edward Prendick, starting with these details: “On February the First,
1887, the Lady Vain was lost by collision with a derelict when about the latitude 1° S.
and longitude 107° W” (3; Intro.). When Edward Prendick commences the story proper,
he begins with similar exactitude, stating what “every one knows” — that “the Lady
Vain . . . collided with a derelict when ten days out from Callao. The long-boat, with
seven of the crew, was picked up eighteen days after by H. M. gunboat Myrtle” (4; ch.
1). He then shifts to private knowledge: although four men in the ship’s dinghy were
thought to have perished, there were actually only three men in the boat, with he himself
as the sole survivor of that group. Here begins his story of what happened between the
time the dinghy was last seen and his being picked up, eleven months later, at about the
same location — the coordinates for which the nephew also provides. Both narrators
maintain their stances of detailed accuracy and objectivity — the nephew will certify the
truth of only that part of his uncle’s story he can substantiate — because the story that
Edward Prendick tells about the eleven months during which he visits Doctor Moreau’s
island is so incredible.
These two layers of purported accuracy and control, grounded in public knowledge,
serve to disarm the incredulity of readers. More importantly, they set off, by contrast, a
story suffused with the operation of chance in human affairs — as illustrated, for instance,
by two ships colliding in a relatively untravelled part of a vast ocean. Throughout The
Island of Doctor Moreau chance and uncertainty undermine order and knowledge. The
novel signifies indeterminacy as the ruling element in the universe and in the human
condition, even subverting its own textual authority for telling the truth. Chance, contin-
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gency, unpredictability, indeterminacy — these elements, inherent in Darwinism, reflect
the novel’s involvement with evolutionary theory.
Apart  from  a quasi-allegorical setup that  promotes  comparison between  Doctor
Moreau’s scientific activities and evolution, the novel establishes three direct connections
to Charles Darwin. First, the protagonist and narrator, Edward Prendick, reveals that he,
like H. G. Wells himself, had been the student of the great biologist and evolutionist
Thomas Huxley, Darwin’s disciple, friend, and champion. A second marker of the story’s
Darwinian provenance is the placement of Moreau’s fictional island in the actual vicinity
of the Galapagos, islands that Darwin visited and made famous. Although during his stay
there Darwin did not recognize that they and their fauna constituted a virtual laboratory
for natural selection, after his return to England they provided crucial hints and evidence
for his theory.
A third connection with Darwin is the novel’s appropriation of the “entangled bank”
that he employs, in the conclusion of On the Origin of Species (1859), to summarize
and promote his theory of evolution. The Island of Doctor Moreau adopts the idea of
entanglement to disrupt conventional, optimistic views about humanity and its place in
the universe. Responding to the controversies about evolutionary theory that Darwin’s
work catalyzed and that permeated the late nineteenth century, Wells’s narrative follows
a negative path in exploring the problematic biological and cultural foundations of hu-
man life. It stakes out those areas of confused human self-understanding that will have
to be disentangled before society can, perhaps, progress on a firmer basis. The question
is, what can be determined in an indeterminate universe, what significant truths might
manifest themselves after falsehoods, perceived as such, have been cleared away?2 In-
tegral to Wells’s text, the implications and omissions of the entangled bank fix a heuristic
starting point. I will begin with Darwin’s famous image and the novel’s immediate ap-
plication of entanglement to signify indeterminacy.
I.
THE ORIGIN DEPLOYS THE ENTANGLED BANK as an image of unity and order so as to
resist the negative implications of chaos and disorder inherent in the process of natural
selection. In evolution via natural selection, those individuals with variations that give
them a competitive edge in given environments will more readily survive, reproduce, and
pass  along to later generations their adaptive  characteristics, which  will continue  to
develop as long as they enhance chances for survival and reproduction. Thus, gradually,
one species evolves from another through interplay of internal and external factors. But
the process can appear depressingly chaotic because of the incessant competition between
individuals and between species for limited resources, because of the death and extinction
that result, because of the apparent randomness of the variations upon which natural
selection builds, and because of the complexity  and instability of the environmental
factors that determine which variations offer survival value. Chance appears to rule.
Darwin, however, in his first reference to the entangled bank, in Chapter 3 of the Origin,
argues against chance: “When we look at the plants and bushes clothing an entangled
bank, we are tempted [incorrectly] to attribute their proportional numbers and kinds to
what we call chance.” This attribution is incorrect, he contends, because the proportions
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and kinds are in fact established and maintained through a systematic and statistically
verifiable process that tends toward order (74–75).
The upbeat conclusion of the Origin further develops the entangled bank as a repre-
sentation of law and order, and of progress as well. It exemplifies the triumph of natural
selection, which, because it “works solely by and for the good of each being, [ensures that]
all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection.” Repre-
senting nature as happy and harmonious, the bank elides the struggle, disorder, and waste
that, as Darwin makes clear elsewhere, attend natural selection:
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds,
with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling
through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different
from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been
produced by laws acting around us. (489)
Again, it is order, not chance, that governs life, and entanglement in the Origin therefore
evidences a harmonious ecological interdependence and equilibrium between species.
The Island of Doctor Moreau picks up on the negative implications of natural selec-
tion that the entangled bank disguises. In Wells’s text entanglement means disorder, not
order or harmony: it entails the commingling of objects, processes, and qualities that strike
the human mind as incompatible or antagonistic because they upset boundaries and
categories; and it points to the limits of knowledge, since the mind, caught in the very
processes it tries to understand, is continually confounded by contingencies, like those
governing the course of Darwinian evolution, too complex to be anticipated or fully
comprehended.3 Ethics, which according to Wells involve the interaction of evolutionarily
determined predisposition with artificial behavioral standards developed for maintaining
ideas of social good, is one focus of such problematic entanglement.4 Another is chance,
which subverts reasoned expectations, mixing unreality with reality, the probable with the
improbable. One function of ethics is to stabilize human life in the face of an indetermi-
nate universe informed by complexity, chance, and consequent unpredictability, but the
beginning of Wells’s novel dramatizes how readily accident or luck, whether good or bad,
can overwhelm standards for guiding behavior and assessing truth. The first page of
Edward Prendick’s story reinforces this theme through its reference to entanglement.
After correcting the mistake others had made in thinking there were four survivors
who had set off in the dingy, Prendick states that “luckily for us and unluckily for himself,”
a sailor trying to join the other three had died in the attempt: “He came down out of the
tangle of ropes under the stays of the smashed bowsprit, some small rope caught his heel
as he let go, and he hung for a moment head downward, and then fell and struck a block
or spar floating in the water” (4; ch. 1). The “tangle” that contributes to the sailor’s death,
overturning him and whatever expectations he had for escape, inaugurates within the
novel a series of images that establish entanglement as a trope.5 Here as elsewhere the
story calls attention not only to how human enterprises become entangled with chance
occurrences, but to how good and bad luck themselves become entangled. In this case, the
sailor’s death seemingly benefits the three survivors, who have to share their scanty
provisions with one less comrade. This episode adumbrates the relativistic, amoral uni-
verse that dominates the novel, and the name of the doomed ship reinforces this picture
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and the pretensions of humans who ignore it. “Lady Vain” suggests the vanity of individu-
als who think they can entirely control their destinies, the vainness or futility of believing
chance can be denied. Also, the ship’s name can be connected to the name-change that
Wells, in notes for revisions, proposed for the ship that rescues Prendick eight days after
the wreck; the Ipecacuanha of the first edition would have become the Red Luck had
Wells acted upon his intent.6 Conflated, the two names, the Lady Vain and the Red Luck,
suggest the supremacy of Lady Luck, or Mother Nature, whose hands, in the Darwinian
vision of competition, struggle, and death, are red with blood.
But as already illustrated, luck cannot always be bad, however one conceives of it —
and it is important to remember that “luck” is subjective, relativistic, and contingent; it is
open to different interpretations based on different standards and on its different conse-
quences for different people, and it is changeable over time since what seems good or bad
in the present can take on the opposite appearance in light of later, unpredictable devel-
opments. Suffering from thirst and hunger like his two companions and finally willing to
participate in cannibalism, Prendick’s life is temporarily saved when the three castaways
draw lots and one of the others is selected to be eaten. Chance makes Prendick look lucky,
and it does so again when the designated victim decides to withdraw from the project, the
other man attacks him, they fall out of the dinghy and drown, and Prendick is delivered
from the potential aggression of his companions or from an act that appalls him. Although
he is left in desperate physical condition, his mere survival turns out to be good, for chance
seemingly intervenes in his favor once more. This occurs when the dinghy crosses paths
with the Ipecacuanha, on which happens to be a man with medical training —
Montgomery, Doctor Moreau’s assistant — who saves Prendick’s life. “‘You were in
luck,’” he tells Prendick, “‘to get picked by a ship with a medical man aboard’” (6; ch. 2);
of course, he is lucky to get picked up at all.
Montgomery contends his saving of Prendick was controlled by chance, “as every-
thing is in a man’s life”; he says he took him on as a patient simply because he happened
to be “bored, and wanted something to do.” That Prendick’s is an amateur biologist also
seems fortuitous, in that Montgomery’s telling Moreau that “Prendick knows something
of science” appears to be the reason, after the bestial captain of the Ipecacuanha casts
Prendick adrift once more, that Moreau changes his mind and saves the castaway (12, 18;
ch. 4, ch. 6). Furthermore, Moreau seemingly affords Prendick better treatment than he
would have done had his guest not been the one-time student of Thomas Huxley. But this
string of good fortune leads to great and long-term suffering because of the ordeals
Prendick undergoes on the island. Also, Prendick’s chance arrival there contributes to
problems for its inhabitants as his fate becomes entangled with theirs. In general, then, the
early part of the narrative establishes chance, with good and bad luck entwined in involved
and unforeseen ways, as a central theme, one that remains equally prevalent throughout
the remainder of the novel. At the same time, “Red Luck” is the form of chance accentu-
ated in the story, whose preoccupation is especially with the negative implications of
natural selection.
Chance, however, should be understood as expression of the contingency that perme-
ates phenomena. The forces of the universe are too multitudinous, varied, changeable, and
intermixed to allow accurate prediction or explanation of any but the most limited and
strictly controlled events. Chance, which we call good or bad luck when the unlikely seems
to impact our lives decidedly, is our explanation for occurrences that appear most unpre-
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dictable relative to evidently realistic expectations and to limited understandings. But
because much of our experience cannot accurately be predicted or explained due to the
many complex, uncontrollable, and mostly unseen forces that bear on it, chance occurs as
a relatively common feature of our lives. To say that chance rules the universe is therefore
to say that contingency governs cognition; our knowing continuously struggles to make
sense of an elusive and wayward reality. In his early essays Wells expresses this view of
contingency in pointing out how readily some unforeseen, complex, and uncontrollable
circumstance, such as radical environmental change or pestilence, might doom humanity
(Early Writings 130–31, 171–72). The universe that The Island of Doctor Moreau evokes
is largely contingent. On three occasions Prendick finds himself adrift in a small boat
caught in so many circumstances of currents and weather that its future is unpredictable.
This situation presents a graphic image of human existence in general, even though most
people do not undergo Prendick’s extremities of helplessness.
The drifting boat is a prominent motif in the naturalistic fiction common during the
period in which Wells wrote his novel; such fiction portrays social and natural worlds
where hostile or, at best, indifferent forces beyond their control determine people’s fates.
One of these forces is chance, sometimes conceived as a sort of implacable antagonist.7
Much naturalistic fiction actually undermines the idea of chance because of the appear-
ance of design in the improbable unrelenting negativity of its effects. Certainly Prendick’s
being cast adrift suggests the antagonistic workings of chance, and the unlikelihood of its
happening three times indicates authorial design rather than chance occurrences. The
story somewhat parts company with naturalism because Prendick is also, against all odds,
saved each time; here then is a degree of even-handedness, a balancing of good and bad
luck, rather than unrelieved negative determinism. Nevertheless, the novel’s overdetermi-
nation of chance along with the overall prevalence of bad fortune, exaggerations bespeak-
ing artistic or polemical purpose, at first glance indeed appear to convey a naturalistic or
even nihilistic message about the pointlessness of the cosmos and the helplessness of
humanity. Over-reacting to his disillusionment in the humanistic ideals that have upheld
him, Prendick arrives at such a view, even though he wills himself to hope for good (87;
ch. 22). But the novel as a whole, more existential than naturalistic, does not. Rather, it
conducts a literary exploration to determine what degree of control and freedom human-
ity might exercise once it acknowledges that its doings are inextricably entangled with
chance and that there is no moral agent outside of itself and its own choices. Although
Doctor Moreau is the potential embodiment of this exploration, his daring but confused
attempts to overcome the randomness of evolution, by dissociating the human from the
animal, constitute a flawed response to a refractory universe.
As prominent as it is, chance is only part of the indeterminacy that saturates the story,
emphasizing the perplexities to which the mind is susceptible. Indeterminacy, for instance,
governs the novel’s treatment of the relationship between humans and animals, another
area of uncertainty relevant to evolution. Evolutionary theory complicates the distinction
between the two; because humans evolved from animals and bear innumerable traces of
this ancestry, there can be no absolute or essentialist gap between them — a point that
Darwin makes repeatedly in The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of the
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872).8 This issue, the entanglement of human and animal,
is broached when Montgomery administers to Prendick “a dose of scarlet stuff” that
“tasted like blood, and made [him] feel stronger” (6; ch. 2). On the one hand, the reference
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to blood recalls that in the dinghy Prendick is willing to defend himself with a knife against
anybody  who tries  to make a  meal of  him,  but that in  despair he finally agrees to
participate in cannibalism; physical suffering, fear, and the instinct for self-preservation
cause him to confront a violent, animalistic part of himself, a dimension he will encounter
repeatedly before he escapes from the island. On the other hand, taking the blood-like
drink proves positive, strengthening him physically as, no doubt, engaging in cannibalism
likewise would have done; our animal nature cannot be denied.9
The difference between the two activities is that there exists, against taking the drink,
no moral injunction like that which at first keeps Prendick aloof from his companions’
cannibalistic enterprise. A preoccupation with ethics is one of the cultural endowments
that seems positive because it separates men from animals. When reified as moral law,
however, it also causes much suffering, as it does for Prendick, because it forces people to
go against the instinctual, elemental part of their own natures or to feel guilty for not
having done so. In this sense, morality actually calls attention to animal-like propensities,
and it sometimes even exacerbates or warps them because of desire for the release that
their expression promises to produce. A related area of confusion is the appearance of
moral relativism that occurs when ethical strictures are found inapplicable or conflicted,
especially in extreme  situations.10 Prendick believes  that killing and cannibalism are
wrong, yet circumstances prepare him to engage in both activities. Later he learns how
arbitrary moral codes can be when he encounters the Law of the Beast People that
Moreau and their situation have created. Only Moreau appears immune to moral injunc-
tion, although it can be argued that this freedom contributes to his and Montgomery’s
deaths; and only Moreau fully accepts moral relativism as he tries, unsuccessfully, to
disentangle the human from the animal through whatever means seem most likely to
succeed. The unstable interpenetration of the cultural and the natural, the human and the
animal, the moral and the amoral comprises a major area of incertitude in Wells’s novel.
The early part of the narrative suggests that the existence of Prendick’s story itself,
not just its content, reflects indeterminacy, expressing itself as an entanglement of con-
trary, and unverifiable, possible truths. The frame narrator, Prendick’s nephew, states that
the “only island known to exist in the region in which my uncle was picked up is Noble’s
Isle, a small volcanic islet, and uninhabited. It was visited in 1891 by H.M.S. Scorpion. A
party of sailors then landed, but found nothing living thereon except certain curious white
moths, some hogs and rabbits, and some rather peculiar rats.” Responding to the sailors’
account, the nephew comments that his uncle’s “narrative is without confirmation in its
most essential particular” (3; Intro.). Although the peculiar life forms appear somewhat
corroborative, hinting at Moreau’s alterations of the animals he had imported, yet it seems
likely that the party, arriving several years after Prendick’s visit, would have reported signs
of human habitation. Prendick reports that Moreau’s buildings burned down, but there
should remain evidence of his and Montgomery’s long residence on the island, including
the “square enclosure . . . built partly of coral and partly of pumiceous lava” that protected
Moreau’s compound (17; ch. 6). Also, the island should have contained many noteworthy
skeletons. The crew of the Ipecacuanha, which might have supported part of Prendick’s
narrative, apparently — it is not quite certain — perishes at sea (3, 85; Intro., ch. 21 ).
Perhaps there never was a Moreau or Montgomery on the island; perhaps they, the
Beast Folk Moreau creates, and Prendick’s adventures among them are all delusions of a
mind seriously disturbed by the trauma of a ship-wreck, by extreme physical distress, by
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solitude, and by near-participation — or actual participation, for all  we know — in
cannibalism. The nephew’s evidence suggests that the Ipecacuanha did indeed pick up the
narrator — the ship, with a puma and other animals aboard, had been in the area at the
time  he  disappeared (3; Intro.). But it is possible that, after being set adrift by the
tyrannical, besotted captain, Prendick washed up on Noble’s Isle and imagined the rest of
his story. Prendick had studied biology with Huxley, and it appears that he knew of the
vivisectional experiments that Moreau had conducted on animals back in England. And
he apparently had experience with a floating menagerie. Therefore, responding to painful
and disorienting experiences at sea, including encounters with real animals and with his
own animalistic predilections, and to being stranded alone on an island and living on the
level of an animal, Prendick unconsciously might have woven prior knowledge into an
evolutionary fantasy that objectifies and to a degree explains inner tensions concerning
his moral nature. The actual peculiarity of some of the animals on the island may reflect,
not the effects of Moreau’s experiments, but the relatively rapid evolutionary adjustments
that can occur on isolated islands recently populated by immigrant species — a circum-
stance Darwin encountered on the Galapagos — and the fast breeding character of the
creatures in question, possibly descendants of escapees from ships that had visited the
island.11 The local fauna might have provided Prendick with food until he was able to
escape in the boat that chances to beach itself there. In view of these considerations,
Prendick’s attendance upon “a mental specialist” after returning to London intimates a
psychological problem more intense than mere post-traumatic anxiety.12 That this special-
ist “had known Moreau” (86; ch. 22) could have provided fortuitous reinforcement, or
even a further motivation, for Prendick’s delusions.
These evidentiary speculations do not prove that Prendick’s tale is false, only that its
degree of accuracy cannot be objectively determined, that truth and falsehood cannot be
disengaged. Regardless of whether or not it is entirely true, his overall story results as
much from chance and uncertainty as do the elements that comprise its narrative. It also
reminds us that narrative fiction necessarily commingles truth and falsehood, with the
human mind predisposed to participate in this entanglement; for example, we are pres-
ently treating make-believe characters and their experiences as if they were real, although
some of them may not be real even within the logic of the narrative. In a number of
respects Wells’s novel does not merely depict pervasive uncertainty, it actively enlists
readers into it in such a way as to accentuate this aspect of the human condition that most
people are quite willing to overlook. Wells is always keen to attack smugness as the first
step in perceiving new possibilities.
The rest of this essay will trace entanglement, as signifier of disorder and indetermi-
nacy, through several overlapping contexts: evolutionary theory in the 1880s and ‘90s;
Wells’s response to it; the novel’s dramatization of this response; and, more specifically,
the troping of entanglement within Prendick’s story.
II.
THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY produced an entangled bank of evolutionary theories.
Darwinism mutated in a variety of ways, rival evolutionary theories struggled against its
dominance, and various highbred varieties appeared. In his biology textbook, first pub-
lished in 1893, H. G. Wells offers a lucid explanation of Darwin’s basic ideas without
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commenting on this contextual confusion. Nevertheless, he was well aware of the scientific
controversies surrounding evolution. Wells faced the same hodge-podge of evolutionary
claims and counter-claims, interpretations and investments that met any serious student
of the subject. That Darwinism should fragment into different lines of thought, lending
itself to various and contradictory agendas, is understandable. Although it sounds simple
enough, evolution via natural selection links a surprising number of components and
implications. Ernst Mayr’s analysis of Darwin’s theory, for example, breaks it into five
separate theories expounded by means of five facts and three inferences (36–39, 72).
Moreover, in part because of this complexity, Darwin’s ideas enable multiple inferences
about natural and human reality; George Levine identifies nine of these — three primary
and six secondary — that together constitute “a sort of gestalt of the Darwinian imagina-
tion” especially relevant to creative writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries (14–20, 13).
Therefore fiction writers preoccupied with Darwinism could seize upon any one or
combination of the sort of elements identified by Mayr and Levine, employing their own
versions of Darwinism and its significance, either in acceptance, rejection, or some divided
response. Moreover, some evolutionary theories were largely non-Darwinian — most
prominently, the “neo-Lamarckian” versions that challenged Darwinism late in the cen-
tury — and these also entered the mix. Knowingly or not, writers such as Wells could
selectively apply these evolutionary variants not only because of the complexity and
suggestiveness of Darwin’s theory in interaction with its competitors, but because so many
aspects of evolutionary thought touched upon equally complicated, ideologically charged
social issues — religious, philosophical, anthropological, economic, and political. In the
case of Darwin, this suggestiveness partially derives from the character of his writing,
which frequently employs figurative language to express processes and ideas inaccessible
to direct observation or verification, thus lending itself to multiple interpretations: “It is
the element of obscurity, of metaphors whose peripheries remain undescribed, which
made The Origin of Species so incendiary — and which allowed it to be appropriated by
thinkers of so many diverse political persuasions. . . . The presence of latent meaning made
The Origin suggestive, even unstoppable in its action upon minds” (Beer 100).
In short, evolutionary theory in general, with its openness to ideological investment,
promotes confusion by offering an abundantly entangled set of potential influences for
any narrative that, like The Island of Doctor Moreau, seriously applies evolution to other
areas of concern. But the confusion in Wells’s text is especially great because it registers
many influences additional to evolution. As Elaine Showalter notes, “The psychological,
literary, social, and intellectual sources of The Island of Dr Moreau are enormously
complex” (77). Nevertheless, evolution is central, and an important dimension of the text’s
evolutionary complexity is its simultaneous representations of the largely contradictory
evolutionary theories of Darwinism and Lamarckism. This entanglement constitutes a
focus of scientific and philosophical contention in the novel.
In Philosophie Zoologique (1809) J. B. Lamarck presents his theory that species
evolve because individuals, in striving to meet their needs in response to changing envi-
ronments, produce inheritable modifications to relevant features; over generations voli-
tion continues to compound these changes, improving the effectiveness of adaptations.
Lamarck’s stress on the formative role of environment is similar to Darwin’s, who also
accepts the idea of acquired characteristics — heritable changes occurring within just one
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generation because of the use and disuse of parts — but only as a secondary factor far less
significant than natural selection. Darwin, however, does not embrace the Lamarckian
implication that mind, through volition and the making of intelligent choices, drives
evolution — that life possesses this mental, virtually inherent tendency toward progress.13
It is true that Darwin sometimes makes evolution sound essentially progressive, since The
Origin figuratively employs purpose and teleology to mitigate the negative overtones of
the randomness, struggle, and death inherent in natural selection; the prime example of
this strategy occurs at the end of The Origin, where the entangled bank obfuscates as much
as it explains.
Unwilling to accommodate itself to natural selection for either substantive or rhetori-
cal purposes, the neo-Lamarckism that arose toward the end of the century was generally
more stringent and doctrinaire than Darwin’s form of Darwinism, since the reemergence
of Lamarckism in intensified terms in the years following the publication of The Origin,
and peaking around the turn of the century, was primarily a reaction against Darwinism.
Much  as Darwin’s  followers  had elaborated on  “Darwinism,”  changing the  master’s
emphases and adjusting his explanations, neo-Lamarckism built on Lamarck’s ideas in a
variety of ways (see Bowler 62–64). What most varieties had in common, however, was
opposition to natural selection and allegiance to inherited characteristics acquired through
use and disuse. The neo-Lamarckian advocate most relevant to literature was Samuel
Butler, a novelist and scientific outsider whose long-term efforts to supply an alternative
to what he saw as the undirected, materialistic process of natural selection led him to a
form of Lamarckism. This he expressed in non-fiction works that ended up influencing
even some scientists. His stance is encapsulated in the title of one of his books, Luck, or
Cunning, As the Main Means of Organic Modification? (1887). Like some of the other
Lamarckians of his time, Butler extracted from Lamarck the idea that the desire to evolve
is innate, expressing itself through the purposeful acquiring and development of new
characteristics as part of an intelligence-driven process. This position led him to a vitalism
in which a life force works through evolution for human betterment; George Bernard
Shaw was Butler’s most famous convert to this metaphysical line of thought.
Wells did not share Butler’s vitalistic notions, but like him he sought in Lamarck’s
theory sanction for the idea of human progress — although not assured progress — and
for the primacy of intelligence in evolution. What particularly attracted Wells to La-
marckism was its suggestion that evolution might occur rapidly, since an organism’s
successful adaptive efforts could be immediately expressed and elaborated upon in the
next generation; in this scheme, unlike natural selection, change did not have to wait upon
the  slow,  undirected  process  of  variation,  competition, and selection  in  which many
generations are needed for appreciable change to occur. In particular, Wells, with his
life-long commitment to education, found in Lamarckism a way in which learning would
be quickly compounded, and appropriately applied, as lessons learned in one generation
became innate in the next. In this way accumulated wisdom would lead inevitably to rapid
social betterment. People simply needed education-enhancing environments.
In the 1880s, however, the ultra- or neo-Darwinism of August Weismann undermined
the Lamarckism of some evolutionists while, in reaction, pushing others further into the
neo-Lamarckian camp. Wells was among of the former. Anticipating genetics, Weismann
propounded his germ plasm theory of inheritance, arguing that characteristics are transmit-
ted from parents to offspring through self-contained units — which Weismann correctly
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associated with chromosomes — that remained unchanged by any influences on the par-
ents’ lives.14 Only natural selection, he argued, influences the fate of the germ plasm,
determining whether or not the organisms that carry it will survive to become parents and
propagate their genetic material, sexually combining it to create new variations for selec-
tion to work upon. Not only did Weismann’s theory directly shore up natural selection,
making it the one and only cause of evolution, a position not even Darwin was willing to
adopt, but his experiments seemed to disprove its rival, the mechanism of acquired charac-
teristics.15 The effect on Wells was to end his hope that humans might rapidly evolve into
intellectually superior forms capable of conquering social problems. While he was finishing
Doctor Moreau, or shortly thereafter, Wells’s essay “Bio-Optimism” (1895) announced his
change of mind; prior to 1895 he had dismissed Weismann’s ideas, but now they strength-
ened his opposition to naïve “bio-optimism,” which neo-Lamarckism seemed to sanction,
and confirmed his acceptance of natural selection, however unpalatable its workings.16
The short-term effect of Wells’s conversion was to reinforce the qualified pessimism
that, despite his recent belief in the educational potential of rapid evolution, had for some
time colored his thinking about mankind’s future. In a series of essays in the early 1890s
he had challenged Victorian complacency by arguing that humans are no less immune to
extinction, and no more significant for the universe, than any other species. Likewise, he
called attention to regression or degeneration, in which over a number of generations
organs or organisms revert to forms or behaviors resembling those they had assumed
during earlier stages of evolution (see “Zoological Retrogression” [1891], Early Writings
158–68). Such could be the fate of humans, an idea at the heart of Wells’s The Time
Machine (1895).
Late Victorian society witnessed a spread of concern about degeneration or decay —
of society, races, species, even the cosmos itself.17 This anxiety fed discordantly on fear
that socioeconomic progress could not be sustained and suspicion that such progress was
already eroding much of traditional cultural value. Along with other sciences, biology
provided support for such concern. Weismann made biological degeneration an important
part of his theory, maintaining that regression results whenever an environment allows the
pressure of natural selection to relax (see Gayon 147–53). He may have had some impact
on Wells’s thinking in this matter, but a nearer and earlier influence was Thomas Huxley,
who did not share Darwin’s generally optimistic outlook on the long-term, unimpeded
workings of natural selection (for example, see Huxley 80–81).18 Darwin contended that
degeneration was adaptive, a de-emphasizing of features that, while once beneficial, had
become superfluous or impedimental because of changed environmental conditions. Dar-
win nevertheless allowed that some retrogression might result from disuse, the explana-
tion favored by Lamarckians, although in general they did not greatly stress degeneration.
For Darwin, Huxley and Wells it was a significant and widespread-spread phenomenon,
and the latter two perceived it as a threat to humanity. The Island of Doctor Moreau gives
full play to the threats of degeneration and extinction that Wells already acknowledged
but that the abandonment of Lamarckian optimism accentuated.
A passage Wells added to his novel late in the writing process particularly signals his
shift away from Lamarckism.19 In Chapter 15, Montgomery tells Prendick that Doctor
Moreau’s creations do not transmit their altered characteristics to offspring: “There was
no evidence of the inheritance of their acquired human characteristics” (53; ch. 15). If new
characteristics cannot be inherited, then, as already discussed, rapid intellectual evolution
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apparently could not occur. Wells’s brief interpolation evinces a significant disillusion-
ment, one that plays into the already confused evolutionary picture that the novel ab-
sorbed from its complex scientific and intellectual environment. Near the center of the
textual confusion, however, lies a tension between the natural selection that Wells now
fully accepted as preeminent and the Lamarckism that he abandoned during the writing
of his novel. As frequently noted, qualities of Doctor Moreau and his experiments reflect
the workings of natural selection. Symbols and figurations of complex referents, however,
are multivocal; they suggest more than their overt associations or their authors’ intentions
and so lend themselves to self-contradiction. This instability of the non-literal no doubt
pertains to the complexities of Moreau’s character and activities, which, although they
evoke  natural  selection in some respects, also carry implications contrary to natural
selection, some  of them  distinctly Lamarckian in their overtones. 20 In general, this
confusion arises from the likening of incommensurable operations — scientific experi-
mentation and evolution. The Lamarckian inflections of Moreau’s activities, however, are
prominent enough that they do not seem merely the incidental results of an unwieldy
comparison of artificial and natural processes. A degree of order in disorder can be
established  by  looking  at the  Moreau  material  as  a hazy evolutionary allegory torn
between two contrary impulses that, during the novel’s composition, were important
intellectual concerns for Wells.
On the one hand, Doctor Moreau’s efforts to evolve animals into humans suggest a
dark but generally accurate reading of Darwinian evolution because his project appears
largely open-ended, subject to chance, and associated with struggle, suffering, and death.21
And natural selection does bear an extravagant experimental quality; variations continu-
ally undergo environmental testing and prove worthy of survival or not. Moreau encour-
ages his identification with the negative view of natural selection, stating that “‘The study
of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature’” (49; ch. 14), and Prendick’s final
assessment of Moreau summarizes this same connection: “he was so irresponsible, so
utterly careless! His curiosity, his mad, aimless investigations, drove him on; and the
Things were thrown out to live a year or so, to struggle and blunder and suffer, and at last
to die painfully. They were wretched in themselves, the old animal hate moved them to
trouble one another” (63–64; ch. 16). On the other hand, Moreau’s investigations appear
non-Darwinian because they are not precisely aimless; whatever his methods, he pursues
the goal of creating rational life freed from physical limitations, and he learns as he goes
along. Mind, intent, choice, and education inform the process, and these are qualities
important for Lamarckism. Thus Moreau’s project is Lamarckian in his effort not only to
bring about rapid evolution, but to create evolutionary order in place of Darwinian
randomness. Another Lamarckian overtone associated with Moreau is his great self-suf-
ficiency and capacity for innovation. These qualities betoken the positive individualism
that Lamarckians perceived as underpinning their form of evolution in which acquired
characteristics result from the insight and efforts of individual aspirants; Darwin stressed
individuality and individual struggle, but not so much the conscious choice-making in-
volved in individualism. Finally, Moreau detects in the Beast People an inherent “upward
striving” (51; ch. 14).22 This tendency suggests the vitalistic strain in Lamarckism that
upholds the idea that animals somehow strive to evolve.
Darwinism and Lamarckism agree in some regards pertinent to the story. For exam-
ple, in their different ways both recognize degeneration, which, as Moreau acknowledges
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and as we see occurring at the end of the novel, is the fate of his creations: they inexorably
return to their animal characters. But because this reversion represents failure for
Moreau, it reinforces the controverting of Lamarckian tendencies implicit in his creations’
inability to pass along their changes to offspring. Furthermore, according to Weismann’s
neo-Darwinism, degeneration occurs whenever the struggle for survival slackens. To the
degree that he personifies natural selection, Moreau manifests this explanation of degen-
eration, for once he creates his beings, he largely ends his involvement in their lives and
they revert; similarly, once the hand of natural selection is removed degeneration begins.
Overall, evolution through natural selection outweighs Lamarckism, but the picture
is far from clear. Moreau’s surgical and psychological manipulations of animals create a
confused nightmare of evolution, and one can speculate that it was a nightmare from
which Wells wished to awake. Doctor Moreau signals not only a shift between largely
contrary ways of interpreting evolution but a shift in Wells’s opinion about the fictional
attention evolution merits in the first place. If it is of no relevance to the future because
acquired characteristics cannot be inherited, or, as he sometimes argued, because in
humans it had come to a stop, then evolution has little bearing for an author immersed in
a plethora of more relevant ideas and interests.23 Thus at some point in composing his
novel, Wells, always a seeker of clarity and order, may have begun trying to disentangle
himself from evolutionary theory by objectifying its complexities and stressing its inappli-
cability. If such were the case, then he shared this desire for self-emancipation with a
number of characters in his fiction.
In his essay “Disentanglement as a Theme in H. G. Wells’s Fiction,” Robert P. Weeks
identifies Doctor Moreau with the many other figures in Wells’s stories who try, with
initial but temporary success, to escape from “a world enclosed by a network of limitations
and dominated by the image of a man driven by a profound, and, at times, an irrational
desire to escape. Although the network appears at first to be impenetrable, the hero finally
succeeds in disentangling himself . . . but ultimately he experiences defeat in the form
either of disillusionment or of death.” Wells’s fiction depicts such attempts to escape from
limiting contingencies but refuses to downplay the difficulties that sometimes make them
appear noble even when they fail. It presents, as Weeks says, “a tough hopefulness”
expressed through the “tension in Wells’s fiction between excessive optimism and chas-
tened optimism, between promise and threat, and between fulfillment and defeat” (440,
444).
Regardless of Wells’s conscious intentions in telling  the story as he did, Doctor
Moreau appears to announce its author’s effort to extricate himself from the snarls of
evolutionary theory, an effort in which he would be more successful than most of his
characters in their quests for freedom. In later works he was free to transmute Lamarckian
optimism and Darwinian pessimism into a cautionary vision of a possible ideal future
always in doubt. Following Doctor Moreau and his rejection of Lamarckism, with the hope
it held out, he would dismiss evolution as a major fictional theme — although he continued
to accept Darwinism and the idea of the indeterminate universe it fosters. Henceforth he
would focus on education. Because contingency renders the future unknowable, education
becomes imperative in a universe where nothing is assured but little is precluded. Indi-
viduals are subject to limitations dangerous not to acknowledge, but humanity as a whole
is potentially less limited than individuals; Wells believed that collectively people can
accomplish much when they honestly assess their constraints and possibilities.
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Doctor Moreau, however, provides no clear or positive cause for optimism. It is,
relative to Wells’s career, a transitional text especially wrapped up in contrary concerns,
as the author’s divided reactions to the novel indicate. Later in his life Wells characterized
the story as a satirical fantasy or romance with a story line not to be taken quite seriously.24
However, in the immediate wake of its publication Wells argued against critics who had
questioned the efficacy of Doctor Moreau’s methods of altering animals, contending that
they are not unrealistic at all.25 He clearly did not find fanciful the possibility of changing
an animal’s character through amputation, grafting, transfusions, vaccination, hypnosis,
and “excisions” to alter “physical passions” (Doctor Moreau 45–47; ch. 14). In fact, Wells
had already argued the plausibility of such procedures in his essay “The Limits of Individ-
ual Plasticity” (1895) (Early Writings 36–39), which uses Moreau’s ideas and language.26
What he does not argue anywhere is that these methods can produce evolution; accord-
ingly, in the story they are not evolutionary except on the level of allegory or satire, and
there they constitute only temporary evolution.
Wells’s resistance to scientific criticism of his novel, in contrast to his later, generally
cavalier assessment, points to its situation somewhere between realism and satirical fan-
tasy. It is realistic in the way science fiction is generally realistic: even though the science
that underpins the story does not fully exist in the form depicted, it is presented as
plausible because founded on principles and terminology taken from current scientific
theory and practice known to many readers. Moreover, the physical and temporal setting
is unremittingly realistic, while the sincere and detailed horror of Prendick’s involvement
in his story also points toward the earnestness of presentation associated with realistic
fiction. The rudimentary society of the Beast Folk, however, with its overt exaggerations
and distortions of human culture, is fanciful. This is most obvious in their chanting of the
laws, which, because they are negative injunctions ascribed to Moreau as a semi-divine
authority, extravagantly parody the Mosaic Code. The realistic and the fantastic, with its
allegorical and satiric weight, do not quite mesh; Prendick continually records his own
sense of unreality as the fantastic and realistic intermingle in grotesque ways. There is
always a sense of disjunction that contributes to the novel’s disquieting atmosphere.27 This
disequilibrium is one reason, I suspect, why the story has been ascribed to so many
different genres and why Wells made so many adjustments to it; he must have realized that
it contributed to a thematic and generic muddle, however much it enabled a dramatically
effective mood.
Indeed, Wells’s many interests and intentions, some of them undergoing change, so
complicate the story that it is pointless to insist upon just one meaning or implication. Not
that this is a weakness: Doctor Moreau tells, on the literal level of character and plot, an
interesting and coherent story; imaginatively it offers a compelling and impressively thor-
ough investigation of late nineteenth-century evolutionary theory; and, like all competent
fiction, it excels in posing intriguing questions in lieu of offering simple answers. In this last
respect, it is superior to much of Wells’s later, more tendentious work. None of this means
that the novel lacks some primary implication offering a degree of coherence, but it can only
to be inferred by disengaging it from those areas of disorder and limitation that the novel
foregrounds; I will return briefly to this matter at the end of the essay.
The point of this section is that the novel treats the confusions of evolutionary theory
but also signals Wells’s desire for what Doctor Moreau fails to accomplish: disengagement
from the ambiguities of evolutionary theory — from what Weeks characterizes more
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generally as the Wellsian goal of disentanglement from limitations. Moreau tries to free
humanity, and himself first of all, from the evolutionary traces of its animal ancestors and
thereby create a wholly rational creature, but his character is too enmeshed in the novel’s
evolutionary confusions to allow him this release. Indeed, the text’s handling of evolution
casts an incapacitating net of indeterminacy over all its characters by destabilizing those
binary oppositions that help people make sense of their world. These include chance and
design, doubt and knowledge, man and animal, nature and culture, amorality and ethics,
degeneration and evolution, pessimism and hope. The novel’s reconfiguration of Darwin’s
entangled bank foregrounds these confusions.
III.
DURING THE EARLY PART OF HIS STAY on Moreau’s island Prendick, not yet aware that
Moreau’s helpers were created from animals, sustains more and more uncertainty about
his situation: “What could it mean? A locked enclosure on a lonely island, a notorious
vivisector, and these crippled and distorted men?” (22; ch. 7). Then, already disturbed by
the ordeals he has undergone and confused by the strangeness of Moreau’s activities and
his bizarre workers, he becomes more distressed as he listens to the agonized screams of
the puma upon which the doctor is operating: “It was as if all the pain in the world had
found a voice.” He is agonized by a pity he admits he would not have felt had he known
of the torture but it had remained silent and unobtrusive (24; ch. 8). He is further upset,
it appears, by the suspicion that his pity is merely a conventional learned response rather
than expression of an inherently ethical human nature; here he encounters again the issue
of moral relativism that self-preservation and cannibalism had broached early in the story.
Understandably, when Prendick flees the compound to escape the puma’s cries, he per-
ceives a world that, although potentially a tropical paradise, appears to him a confused
hell reflecting his cognitive and ethical turmoil: “But in spite of the brilliant sunlight and
the green fans of the trees waving in the soothing sea-breeze, the world was a confusion,
blurred with drifting black and red phantasms” (24; ch. 8).
Twice in his story he calls the jungle a “green confusion” (27, 65; ch. 9, ch. 17): he
projects his mental state onto nature, and nature itself, when interpreted apart from
comforting ideologies and evasions, readily enables a confused experience fraught with
indeterminacy. Prendick’s confusion results from the inability of his internalized cultural
nature any longer to impose order on an external nature that encourages the disruption
of mental and moral categories. The ultimate source of confusion is Prendick’s mind,
which, unable to assimilate his experiences to his self-conceptualizing codes and con-
structs, must interpret the external world as confusion. With its resistances to vision,
orientation, and movement, and with its dizzying superabundance of phenomena, the
jungle is the form of nature that most readily promotes confusion and entanglement.28
John R. Reed notes this connection of the jungle and mental entanglement within Wells’s
life and work:
Wells never felt comfortable with jungles, which serve him as a consistent metaphor for
entanglement, confusion, and  a threateningly abundant disorder. As obstructive  under-
growth, the jungle represented an impediment to progress; as an environment for hostile
predators it signified the dread characteristics of man’s unenlightened state. Thus the jungle
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could be both an external condition signifying frustration and difficulty, and an internal
condition of fear against the outbreak of fierce impulses and instincts.
Reed adds that, as an obstacle and as the locus of beasts and bestiality, the jungle was
“daunting” and “terrifying” for Wells. The jungle, however, is balanced by the inclusion,
in a number of Wells’s works, of the garden, the site of natural and cultural coherence. It
is probably derived, Reed says, from Huxley’s metaphorical application of the garden in
the “Prolegomena” to Evolution and Ethics (35).
In Doctor Moreau there is no garden. The significance of this absence, I believe, is
that in his novel Wells confronted his own terrors and uncertainties, including uncertain-
ties about what he had learned as the student of Huxley; it was a way of clearing the
air before he went on to other matters. Because he was openly and imaginatively con-
fronting his own “bogle” (to use Montgomery’s word [31; ch. 10]) and facing his own
jungle, participating in a psychological exercise of great personal import, Wells was led
into a probably unanticipated project — the artistic challenging of his own intellectual
positions, as he does both in reassessing the relative merits of Darwinism and La-
marckism and in representing the mental flaws in a scientist who actually articulates
many of his pet scientific theories and notions.29 The result is a “green confusion” — a
phrase confusedly conflating color and psychology — that signifies entanglement both
as a theme and as a condition of nearly every aspect of the novel. Chapter 9, “The Thing
in the Forest,” in particular dramatizes entanglement through its adaptation of Darwin’s
entangled bank.
In chapter 8 Prendick calls his mental state a “tangle of mystification” (22). Echoing
the tangle of ropes at the beginning of the novel, entanglement again serves as emblem of
indeterminacy — of the unpredictable and unknowable in a world of mixed phenomena.
Furthermore, it introduces the series of Darwinian tangles in chapter 9, where Prendick’s
encounter with the Leopard-man, the most dangerous and elusive of Moreau’s creations,
raises his bewilderment to an even higher level. Robert Philmus comments on one of these
references to entanglement, a passage in which Prendick, on his way back to Moreau’s
compound, enters “another expanse of tangled bushes” (28; ch. 9). Philmus’s annotation
of this passage speculates that “[t]he ‘tangled bushes’ are perhaps meant to recall Darwin’s
‘tangled bank’ as an image of the complex involvement of species with each other in the
evolutionary struggle” (93n33). However, it should be added that there are numerous
instances of entanglement in the chapter, with the word “tangle” itself, in one form or
another, appearing a number of times as the narrator describes his bewildering experi-
ences.
The chapter begins with a virtual parody of Darwin’s entangled bank. Having escaped
from Moreau’s compound and the puma’s cries, Prendick comes upon a “narrow valley”
with a stream: “the rivulet was hidden by the luxuriant vegetation of the banks save at one
point. . . . On the farther side I saw through a bluish haze a tangle of trees and creepers.”
After his former dismay, Prendick finds the scene “pleasant,” and he falls “into a tranquil
state midway between dozing and waking.” “Then suddenly upon the bank of the stream
appeared Something — at first I could not distinguish what it was. It bowed its round head
to the water, and began to drink. Then I saw it was a man, going on all-fours like a beast”
(25; ch. 9). By appearing upon a literal entangled bank within this carefully established
scene, the Leopard-man raises, through the observer’s interpretive confusion, the same
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questions that had perplexed so many readers of The Origin of Species: what is humanity
and how does it relate to other creatures?
Prendick feels this confusion as he and the creature look at one another: “staring one
another out of countenance, we remained for perhaps the space of a minute” (25; ch. 9).
Perceiver and perceived, self and other, are intertwined in such a complex and unsettling
manner that it leaves in doubt Prendick’s own identity. Whose face is whose? Both are
“out of countenance.” Later on Prendick encounters, in the Beast People’s ritualistic
chanting of their code, the ambiguous mixture of assertion and uncertainty in the refrain,
“Are we not Men?” (38; ch. 12). In his meeting with the Leopard-man, Prendick faces the
seemingly inverse but essentially same question: is he not an animal? Materializing in the
midst of a dream-like state and in the context of profound uncertainty, the Leopard-man
represents a primordial embodiment of Prendick’s unconscious as the narrator faces his
own evolutionary legacy and experiences the consequent disarrangement of his ontologi-
cal and moral identity.
The eerily close connection between Prendick and his antagonist is stressed later in
the chapter as they follow parallel paths, stopping and starting together, with the Leop-
ard-man keeping just out of his sight in the vegetation, at one point partially “hidden by
a tangle of creeper” (27; ch. 9). Symbolically, Prendick is stalked by an animal nature that
he does not wish to acknowledge as his own. And yet, significantly, later in the novel
Prendick proprietarily refers to this nemesis as “my Leopard-man” (54; ch. 15).30 As
Prendick’s double, the Leopard-man incorporates those primitive elements in the narrator
that have continually been forced upon his awareness since the shipwreck; it is as if the
creature and the other Beast Folk as well actually emerge from his own nightmarish
fantasy — which quite possibly they have if, as discussed earlier, Prendick’s story is largely
delusional. That the Leopard-man is the first and most powerful of Moreau’s creations to
revert to its animal ancestry makes it a particularly strong assertion of Prendick’s atavism.
The confused interrelationship between stalker and prey intensifies when Prendick’s
thought is paraphrased so that the pronoun “he” can refer to himself or the Leopard-man:
“What on earth was he — man or beast?” Immediately afterwards the narrator, in trying
to answer the question, to break through the tangle of identities enveloping man and
beast, forces his way through “a tangle of . . . bushes,” confronts the other, gazes into his
eyes, and demands, “Who are you?” The Leopard-man is unable to meet Prendick’s gaze
or answer the question: “No!” he said suddenly, and turning went bounding away . . .
through the undergrowth” (27; ch. 9). The creature cannot answer because it is unsure of
his own identity, being both man and animal, and, as a symbolic projection, it cannot
reveal itself to a consciousness unwilling to accept its own animal nature, an unwillingness
that Prendick demonstrates repeatedly.
The Leopard-man unsettles not only the distinction between man and animal, but
more generally that between culture and nature. Is it primarily the product of culture or
nature? Are humans primarily the product of culture or nature? What, in fact, is nature
apart from cultural interpretations of it? Can culture legitimately conceive of the non-cul-
tural at all? Prendick’s stalker represents a disquiet about the status of the self that most
people have experienced to one degree or another; the narrator must have brought it with
him before circumstances raise it to a pitch too intense entirely to ignore. As Jill Milling
puts the matter, “the combinational creature is the product of a metaphorical process that
discovers relationships between contrasting human and animal characteristics; the partial
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transformation of these related opposites into the image of the beast-man symbolizes a
union of or conflict between nature and culture rooted in man’s uncertainty about his own
nature and his place in the universe” (110).31 This conflict expresses itself as a feeling of
disorientation entailing the intermixture of “everyday reality” with radically contradictory
qualities usually concealed beneath constructions of the normative.
In particular, Prendick’s initial encounter with the Leopard-man recalls Freud’s char-
acterization of the uncanny as an experience of “dread and creeping horror” that occurs
“either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by
some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem to be
confirmed” (249, 248). Prendick’s buried infantile life, dating from a pre-linguistic stage
prior to his self-definition as “human,” emerges — along with a “primitive belief” in the
co-identity of the human and animal worlds — to unsettle ego boundaries. The result is a
doubling in which the sense of his conventional self struggles with an emergent one that
is both familiar, because it is his, and unfamiliar because it has been repressed. This is the
experience that Prendick describes when, in an episode sandwiched between his first
encounters with the Leopard-man, he witnesses three of Moreau’s creatures who prompt
“two inconsistent and conflicting impressions of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest
familiarity” because of their unaccountable mixture of animal and human traits (27; ch.
9). All of Prendick’s experiences on the island occasion similar confusions of mixed ideas
and perceptions that confound beliefs about everyday reality.
His  experiences seem  all the  more unsettling  because  Prendick,  a  civilized man
cultivated with ideals of human dignity and justice, from the first is consistently forced to
confront a natural order whose overwhelming imperative is the Darwinian struggle to
survive. For example, he comes upon the three Beast Folk in “a kind of glade . . . made
by a fall; seedlings were already starting up to struggle for the vacant space: and beyond,
the dense growth of stems and twining vines and splashes of fungus and flowers closed in
again” (26; ch. 9). Prendick is threatened not only with his own death, but with a realiza-
tion that life and death appear of little significance because they are so profuse and
interfused in the new world he inhabits. The setting in which he stumbles upon the bloody,
decapitated body of a rabbit, newly killed by the Leopard-man, illustrates this extravagant
indeterminacy of life and death: “I was startled by a great patch of vivid scarlet on the
ground, and going up to it found it to be a peculiar fungus, branched and corrugated like
a foliaceous lichen, but deliquescing into slime at the touch. And then in the shadow of
some luxuriant ferns I came upon an unpleasant thing — the dead body of a rabbit covered
with shining flies” (25–26; ch. 9). Prendick’s fussy scientific vocabulary cannot disguise the
implication that life in general is an inhuman(e) affair “scarlet” with blood and, because
inseparable from non-life, of no definitive status. In its confounding of human conceptu-
alizations life is as alien seeming as the strange fungus, which lives upon and readily
devolves into death, and as ephemeral as the rabbit that sustains the life of flies. Again
Prendick confronts a Darwinian nature of confused boundaries and entangled categories.
This mental confusion intensifies as the Leopard-man stalks him and it grows dark:
“Prendick’s nightmarish experiences in the forest dramatize in physical terms his loss of
conceptual clarity. As darkness closes in, all things melt together ‘into one formless
blackness’ [Wells, Doctor Moreau 28]. He is then pursued through the forest by an
unclassifiable creature (the Thing)” (Seed 9). Appropriately, the narrator calls himself
“perplexed” (in two editions of the novel) and then “hopelessly perplexed” (28n[c], 29;
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ch. 9), using a word derived from Latin forms for “involved, confused, intricate” as well
as “interwoven” and “tangled” (Oxford English Dictionary). At first a matter of entangled
categories, his perplexity is exacerbated by his dangerous connection to the Leopard-man
who, in reverting to its animal nature by overcoming the moral strictures that Moreau had
inculcated in him, represents a psychological as well as a physical threat to Prendick, who
is in danger of following the same path.
The Leopard-man calls into question not only Prendick’s psychological condition, but
Moreau’s as well. Why would he create something potentially so dangerous? One possible
answer is that carnivores are often more intelligent than other animals, thereby offering
greater potential for further intellectual development. Moreover, the Leopard-man, the
disfigured puma that eventually kills Moreau, and the other once and future carnivores
pose, in the innate savageness of their natures, a greater challenge and thus greater
potential satisfaction for a man obsessed with shaping beasts into rational, civilized crea-
tures. There remains, however, the more fundamental question of why he wishes to
perform these conversions in the first place. As an expression of individual psychology,
Doctor Moreau and his activities are no more consistent than they are as evolutionary
figurations confusedly mixing Darwinism and Lamarckism. His motivation is particularly
equivocal.
Moreau’s explanations of his activities appear as mixed as everything else in the novel.
Nicoletta Vallorani expresses the matter well: “Wells’s discourse on evolution as voiced
by Moreau maps out a scientific landscape whose value, in terms of narrative effect, is to
be seen in the creation of multiple levels of ambiguity, endlessly duplicating the contro-
versial nature of the Darwinian theory itself” (248). One level of ambiguity involves
Moreau’s two  explanations for  his  activities: he wants  to see  how far  he  can go  in
artificially evolving the physical forms of life — of pushing “plasticity” of form to the
utmost — and he wants to evolve life beyond the necessity of experiencing pain. He
mingles these ambitions in his explanations to Prendick, but their relationship to one
another remains uncertain and contradictory. “‘I wanted — it was the one thing I wanted
— to find out the extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape’” (48; ch. 14), Moreau states,
but his preoccupation with overcoming pain means that ultimate plasticity cannot be his
only main goal; form and feeling are of two different orders. It can be argued that finding
the limit of plasticity will perhaps entail establishing the limits of pain, that “plasticity” is
mental as well as physical; but the matter is unclear. Moreau’s emphasis on pain is also
problematic because of his actual procedures and outcomes. He may indeed be devoted
to improving  life by creating beings  that can rationally control their  own fates  and
transcend pain, and his dedication and daring in pursuing this seemingly noble end are
perhaps incorporated in the apparent name of his domain, Noble’s Isle. The same name,
however, also points ironically to the nature of his creations thus far. These natives are
anything but noble savages, and the pain that Moreau wishes to transcend dominates their
lives. In their creation Moreau subjects them to unbearable agonies, and then he turns
them lose to lives of suffering.
Furthermore, Moreau’s emphasis on pain weakens his assertion that only by chance
did he select the human form as the ideal toward which he would work — “He confessed
that he had chosen that form by chance” (47; ch. 14). When Moreau talks about physically
and mentally overcoming pain, it is human pain and human evolution to which he refers,
and so the evolution of humanity seems to be his real objective: “so long as pain underlies
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your propositions about sin — so long, I tell you, you are an animal”; “with men, the more
intelligent they become . . . the less they will need the goad [of pain] to keep them out of
danger”; “[t]his store which men and women set on pleasure and pain . . . is the mark of
the beast upon them — the mark of the beast from which they came!” (47, 48; ch. 14).
Moreau’s chief concern therefore is with man and how to evolve him into a higher form;
this evolution, directed by intellect, suggests Lamarckism rather than the Darwinism that
Moreau’s and Prendick’s stress on the role of chance and cruelty in the doctor’s proce-
dures seems to indicate. Unable to operate on actual humans, Moreau consciously, not by
chance, strives to create the more-than-human by first of all moving animals toward
humanity; he attempts to encompass the whole evolutionary process, from animal to man
and from man to superman.
Moreau’s explanation of his project reveals that he is far from being the objective
practitioner of pure, open-ended research he claims to be. His sticking a knife into his
thigh to demonstrate the possibility of painlessness hints at a considerable egotistic invest-
ment — that it is especially for himself that he seeks an ideal of pure intellect unencum-
bered by bodily limitations. The evolving of animals objectifies his wish to evolve himself,
and his willingness to inflict excruciating pain — scientifically unnecessary since he might
have anesthetized his subjects (Fried 110) — emphasizes his intellectual and physical
control over his victims and hence his exalted status in being entirely free from the great
pain he inflects and witnesses.32 Accordingly, a sadistic assertion of semi-divine agency
underlies the baptismal imagery with which Moreau invests his acts of metamorphosis:
“Each time I dip a living creature into the bath of burning pain I say, ‘This time I will burn
out all the animal; this time I will make a rational creature of my own!’” (51; ch. 14). The
phrase “my own” and the four other first-person references are telling. Moreau is the
primary focus of Moreau’s work, and the acid-like process that obsesses him represents a
longed-for burning away of his own perceived insufficiencies. The binary logic behind the
process of eliminating “the animal” implies that his goal is the god-like one of creating the
human or super-human, not just some form chosen at random.
As would-be creator of evolved humans, an obsessed scientist beset by self-deceptions
and mixed motives, Moreau resembles Victor Frankenstein, to whom a passage deleted
from an early manuscript version of The Island of Doctor Moreau alludes.33 He is also
reminiscent of Frankenstein because he cannot control the consequences of his activities.
Despite Moreau’s assurance and self-control, the “green confusion” that reigns on the
island ultimately represents, not just Prendick’s perplexities, but the contingencies that
overwhelm his host as well. Events in which chance colludes with Moreau’s fallibility attest
to his inability to exercise complete dominance over his experiments. Of the agonized
legless monster that spread death and destruction, Moreau says, “It only got loose by
accident — I never meant it to get away” (50; ch. 14). The escapee prefigures the puma-
creature that eventually breaks free and kills Moreau. The doctor also errs by allowing
Montgomery to import rabbits as a food source for them, since this act contributes to the
dangerous reversion of some of his creatures to predation and intractability (58; ch. 16).
And the chance that brings one of Huxley’s former students to the island, and influences
Moreau to let him stay, places Prendick, while still convinced that Moreau is making
animals out of people and not vice versa, in a position to stir up the beast-folk to rebellion
against their creator (43; ch. 13). Like the world itself, the island is an imperfect laboratory,
unable to contain the chaos inherent in any complex system subject to manifold variables.
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The “painful disorder” that Prendick perceives in Moreau’s world (64; ch. 16) mirrors
that of Darwinian nature, but it appears even more disorderly because, as already noted,
it is figuratively combined with elements contrary to natural selection. As practitioner of
an artificial Lamarckian form of evolution intelligently directed toward the creation of
ultra-rational supermen, Moreau tries to impose goals on a developmental process while
at the same time contradictorily avowing an ideal of pure, undirected experimentation
closer to Darwinism. The same confusion occurs in his assertion that pain is “a useless
thing that [will be] ground out of existence by evolution sooner or later” (48; ch. 14). This
process intimates natural selection, but the idea that pain will become useless is predicated
on his belief that life will first become intelligent enough to recognize sources of harm and
consciously act so as to avoid them. Again, the realization of this intellectual evolution
depends, not on chance and a struggle for survival, but on his intellect; this intellect though
proves inadequate for producing such evolution.
The tendency of his creatures to revert particularly stymies Moreau. It may be true
that his failures, as is often the case in scientific experimentation, would have eventually
lead to the success had he been able to continue his work and correct his errors, but his
confused motives, obsession, and limited knowledge of himself and the future preclude
continuation. They cause him to be as entrapped by circumstances as are Prendick, the
beast-folk, and Montgomery as well, all of whom suffer consequent physical or mental
retrogression. The humans in the story are no better off than are the sub-humans. The
Beast Folk dramatize the condition of humanity, precariously clinging to what civilization
it has attained, ever at the mercy of a confused, complex universe as likely to support as
oppose suffering, degeneration, and extinction. After the puma kills Moreau, the body of
the scientist who had tried to distance himself from his creations ends up ironically
entangled with dead Beast People: “[on] the pile of wood and faggots . . . Moreau and his
mutilated victims lay, one over another. They seemed to be gripping one another in one
last revengeful grapple” (72; ch. 19). Everyone’s fate is entangled with that of the other
participants in a drama of elusive import and unpredictable consequences.
The entangled bank exemplifies a confused universe again in chapter 16, where it
informs the hunt for the Leopard-man that occurs after Prendick reports to Moreau the
creature’s dangerous reversion. This episode evidences the connection between hunters
and hunted, men and monsters, all ensnared in the same biological and environmental
contingencies. Prendick detects in Moreau lust for capturing the malefactor and exultation
in his own power akin to that of the enthusiastically participating Beast People (60; ch.
16). The description of the chase through entangling vegetation further accentuates the
connection between its human and partially human participants in an uncongenial natural
world; both enter “a dense thicket, which retarded our movements exceedingly, though
we went through it in a crowd together — fronds flicking into our faces, ropy creepers
catching us under the chin, or gripping our ankles, thorny plants hooking into and tearing
cloth and flesh together” (61; ch. 16). When Prendick describes the final cornering of the
quarry he once again employs terms of entanglement. This scene recalls his earlier expe-
rience of himself being a hunted animal when, mistakenly believing himself fodder for
Moreau’s experiments, he hides in an entangled bank reminiscent of the one where he first
sees the Leopard-man: “I scrambled out at last on the westward bank, and with my heart
beating loudly in my ears, crept into a tangle of ferns” (34; ch. 11). The final cornering of
the Leopard-man echoes both this scene and the creature’s stalking of Prendick in chapter
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9. As the prey cowers “in the bushes through which [Prendick] had run from him” earlier
in the story, the pursuers surround the creature within this “tangle of undergrowth” (62;
ch. 16). Thus throughout the novel scenes of entanglement, entailing parallels in plot as
well as in imagery, enmesh its various characters in the same complexities of mixed
circumstances and fragmented understandings.
Finally Prendick spots the cornered Leopard-man “through a polygon of green, in the
half darkness under the luxuriant growth.” On this occasion Prendick momentarily ac-
knowledges the connections between himself and this other that hitherto have been only
implicit in his descriptions: “seeing the creature there in a perfectly animal attitude, with
the light gleaming in its eyes and its imperfectly human face distorted with terror, I
realised again the fact of its humanity” (62; ch. 16). Recognizing their shared identity, and
in a setting momentarily freed from the negative imagery of entanglement, Prendick
mercifully shoots the wretch. “Poor brutes,” he says afterwards, and he goes on to express
great empathy for the Beast Folk (63; ch. 16). These moments of grace, of positive
self-transcendence, do not endure, however. The reverting Beast Folk become despicable
to Prendick, and he ultimately identifies with other beings only as fellow victims of a
meaningless, mixed-up world full of constraints on human freedom.
That Prendick spots the Leopard-man through a “polygon” points to these constraints
upon both pursuer and prey. A polygon, a shape with a number of angles and facets, is a
rather strange, technically precise word to apply to a gap in vegetation; it indicates both
multiple-sidedness and straight lines. But if we connect the two-dimensional polygon —
the form the opening might assume from Prendick’s vantage point — with its three-dimen-
sional relative, the polyhedron (a “solid bounded by polygons” — American Heritage
Dictionary), Wells’s figure takes on evolutionary significance relevant to the novel.
Stephen J. Gould explains that the polyhedron is the shape that Francis Galton, Darwin’s
cousin and a man whose work Wells would have known, uses to express the idea that
natural selection can mold an organism into a great but still limited number of forms; the
possibilities are like the facets of a polyhedron, onto any one of which the evolutionary
pressure of natural selection might tip it. Galton employs the polyhedron in discussing the
malleability of man and other species under selective breeding; Gould connects this
discussion to Darwin’s treatment of what the Origin calls the “plastic” qualities of domes-
ticated animals that breeders use to shape them to their specifications (Gould 382–85).
Moreau says that he has dedicated his life “to the study of the plasticity of living forms”
(46; ch. 14). Thus the Leopard-man’s enclosure within a polygon hints at the plasticity
Moreau employs in his “breeding” of the creature but also the natural limitations on
Moreau’s activities, constrained by inherent predisposition. That the Leopard-man has
reverted underscores these limitations. For Wells, possibilities are always entangled with
constraints, and progress necessitates a realistic assessment of both. In Doctor Moreau,
however, the constrictions that surround its characters severely circumscribe their scope
for freedom, an interpretation of reality to which Prendick ends up fully subscribing after
circumstances have victimized him repeatedly.
At the end of chapter 16 Prendick addresses entanglement one last time, but trans-
lates it from natural into cultural terms. Now it is machinery that, through its unfathom-
able complexities, represents confusion and helplessness for all the actors alike: “A blind
Fate, a vast pitiless Mechanism, seemed to cut and shape the fabric of existence; and I,
Moreau (by his passion for research), Montgomery (by his passion for drink), the Beast
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People with their instincts and mental restrictions, were torn and crushed, ruthlessly,
inevitably, amid the infinite complexity of its incessant wheels” (64; ch. 16). Normally
conceived in opposition to nature, culture, in a further breakdown of conventional cate-
gories and binary oppositions, signifies the same contingent reality as does the green
confusion of entrapping vegetation. In this light, the imagery is even more crushingly
pessimistic than it appears at first glance, implying that the cultural environment is no
more likely to support human aspirations than is the natural world, since their terms are
interchangeable. Both are unremittingly “Darwinian” — this is the lesson that devastates
Prendick.
IV.
THE READER, HOWEVER, need not fully subscribe to the disillusionment of a man who
ends up as an unhinged, frightened, and possibly untruthful misanthrope.34 Despite its
many confusions, The Island of Doctor Moreau functions well as a cautionary tale whose
manifest exaggerations and distortions highlight the dangers of ego, of self-isolation, and
of evasion of reality — unsympathetic and indeterminate though it may be — through
science, religion, or any other means. It offers a sobering diagnosis of the human condition
but not a prescription for despair, for only by recognizing constraints upon its autonomy
might humanity free itself, to some degree, from what Wells characterizes as the impeding
“currents and winds of the universe in which [humanity] finds itself” (Early Writings
218).35 Wells’s novel fully attests to the perplexities of entanglement within the Darwinian
universe, but, as both Prendick’s own condition and his characterization of Moreau’s and
Montgomery’s failures suggest, humans contribute to “infinite complexity” through their
own ignorance and bad choices.
University of Montana
NOTES
1. The novel’s mix of attributes has allowed various commentators to identify it as satire,
parody,  parable, fable, allegory, myth, fantasy, fairy tale, romance, burlesque, tragedy,
comedy, tragi-comedy, farce, and science fiction. Two years before the appearance of Doctor
Moreau, in his discussion of evolution in the Text-Book of Biology, Wells virtually predicted
such a melange for any thorough-going fictional treatment of evolution that he might
produce: “In the book of nature there are written . . . the triumphs of survival, the tragedy
of death and extinction, the tragi-comedy of degradation and inheritance, the gruesome
lesson of parasitism, the political satire of colonial organisms. Zoology is, indeed, a philoso-
phy and a literature to those who can read its symbols” (1: 131).
2. As Bozzeto says, Wells’s scientific romances, including the novel in question, “clearly pre-
sent themselves as fictions that encourage a figurative reading, [but] they do not proceed by
assertion or lend themselves to a dogmatic reading; instead they leave open the question
they deal with, prompting reflection more than eliciting an answer” (38). Nevertheless, after
reflection has been prompted over the course of the story, Doctor Moreau does suggest some
provisional answers to the questions it raises.
3. Wells accepted the natural disorder attendant on Darwin’s theory but found the theory itself,
especially because of its comprehensiveness and explanatory value, to entail considerable
592 VICTORIAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE
order. “[B]y drawing together strands from all disciplines and relating them in one unifying
theory, [Darwinian evolution] seemed to him to symbolize order itself. The desire for order
became a life-long craving in Wells, brought up in a world of confusion and incompetence”
(Haynes 21). It is important to recognize this longing for order, even the latent presence of
order, that lies beneath the confusions of Doctor Moreau. In his Text-Book Wells assured
readers that “[w]ith an increasing knowledge of the facts of the form of life, there gradually
appears to the student the realization of an entire unity shaped out by their countless, and
often beautiful, diversity” (1: 132).
4. In his essay “Human Evolution, an Artificial Process,” Wells states that “what we call
Morality becomes the padding of suggested emotional habits necessary to keep the round
Paleolithic savage in the square hole of the civilised state. And Sin is the conflict of the two
factors — as I have tried to convey in my Island of Doctor Moreau” (Early Writings 217).
5. In a parallel passage, Wells changed the word “mass” to “tangle” in the incomplete, early
version of the novel (see Wells, Doctor Moreau 101n[m]), although nowhere else does he
mention entanglement in this manuscript. I believe the change was a late one that serves as
a thematic bridge to his revision of the story as The Island of Doctor Moreau. This first
version is called simply Doctor Moreau, the new emphasis on “Island” perhaps reflecting the
revised story’s emphasis on entanglement and hence on a more fully described island setting
replete with jungle vegetation (see n28 below). Moreau’s island represents, in effect, an
evolution from the aridity of Darwin’s Galapagos to the lushness of his entangled bank.
6. See  Philmus’s note  on the subject of  the name  change (Wells, Doctor Moreau 89n1).
Ipecacuanha, an emetic, indicates the repulsiveness of cannibalism and, more generally,
basic and unpleasant biological realities. As such it functions as a reminder of Prendick’s
animal nature, the recognition of which he tries and fails to purge while he unwillingly voids
those ethical certainties that have upheld his life.
7. The novels of Thomas Hardy, which are full of Darwinian elements, particularly enact this
role. Presiding as a malevolent agent with a perverse sense of humor, chance became
increasingly pronounced in his narratives, nearly always frustrating the needs and aspirations
of his characters.
8. For example, Darwin writes, “there is no fundamental difference between man and the
higher mammals in their mental faculties” (Descent 35). Montgomery’s assistant, who is the
most advanced, sympathetic, and ambiguous of the Beast People, seemingly represents this
convergence of man and animal through his name, M’ling, which suggests a mingling of
natures. But the two natures of the Beast People do not meld smoothly, any more than they
do in the humans that they, on one level, represent. Wells’s early essays suggest that the
development of language, culture, and ethics encourages this uneasiness by allowing both
the drawing of a distinction between man and beast and the discomfort that results when the
distinction, as it often must, begins to break down. Wells therefore encourages readers to
recognize culture as the artificiality it is, freely choosing to give it their allegiance because of
the advantages it confers, while consciously selecting the behavioral standards that will best
allow it to function. Our animal natures are a foundation to build upon, not to eradicate.
9. Overall, the taking of the drink functions as an anti-communion, emphasizing brutality,
preoccupation with the physical, and isolation. It is an appropriate herald for what Prendick
will experience on Moreau’s island.
10. Wells stresses the relativistic character of morality in his essay, “Morals and Civilization”
(Early Writings 220–28).
11. Wells writes about this acceleration of evolution on islands in a 1895 essay, “Influence of
Islands.” See Bowen 322–24 on the mythic and scientific implications of the island setting.
12. According to Showalter, “The introduction [by Prendick’s nephew] . . . places the story in a
psychological  context,  and offers  an invitation  to the reader to consider the tale as a
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hysterical hallucination, the result of a repressed trauma. The nature of that trauma has to
do with cannibalism.” Showalter goes on to analyze Prendick’s experiences in relation to the
Medusa affair, in which survivors of a shipwreck, abandoned on a raft, engaged in cannibal-
ism. Showalter concludes that Prendick may well have done likewise (81).
13. Dawkins states that “there was a dose of mysticism in Lamarck’s actual words — for
instance, he had a strong belief in progress up what many people, even today, think of as the
ladder of life; and he spoke of animals striving as if they, in some sense, consciously wanted
to evolve” (289).
14. Today we know that external conditions can in fact produce genetic mutations.
15. Weismann cut the tails off of successive generations of mice to demonstrate that the acquired
characteristic of taillessness could not be inherited. Some Lamarckians felt the experiment
was flawed because it was not the volition of the mice that produced the alterations.
16. “Bio-Optimism” maintains that “Natural Selection grips us more grimly than it ever did,
because the doubts thrown upon the inheritance of acquired characteristics have deprived
us of our trust in education as a means of redemption for decadent families.” Emphasizing
the dark side of natural selection, Wells adds that “[t]he names of the sculptor who carves
out the new forms of life are . . . Pain and Death. And the phenomena of degeneration rob
one of any confidence that the new forms will be in any case or in a majority of cases ‘higher’
. . . than the old” (Early Writings 208, 209). Given these views, Wells could not look for
human improvement via physical evolution or inheritable mental changes brought about
through education. Therefore, from this point on, Wells stressed cultural, rather than physi-
ological, change.
17. Asker discusses Wells and Doctor Moreau in regard to degeneration; Greenslade’s book is
a recent broad treatment of the subject in relation to British literature.
18. Huxley also influenced Wells to admire pure research, to view scientific investigation “as
an open-ended voyage of discovery, full of unpredictable discoveries” (Desmond 540).
Moreau’s methods constitute a parody of this attitude.
19. Philmus points this out in the introductory essay to his excellent variorum edition (xvii),
which reflects his reconstruction of the novel’s complex compositional history in light of the
many and varied Moreau manuscripts and editions that he sorts out. Appropriately, the
textual history is as complex and, in some instances, as uncertain as the various constituents
of the story.
20. As a literal character and as a personification at once of two forms of evolution, Moreau is
a confused enough figure. But he is even more so because he also represents the Old
Testament creator and law-giver, thereby introducing into the novel a theological dimension
that has received much critical attention (for example, see Beauchamp). Moreau, like the
novel as a whole, is impressive in offering resistance to simple interpretations.
21. Moreau says to Prendick, “I went on with this research just the way it led me. . . . I asked a
question, devised some method of obtaining an answer, and got — a fresh question. . . . You
cannot imagine the strange, colourless delight of these intellectual desires! The thing before
you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem!” (48; ch. 14).
22. Moreau, however, attributing it in part to a sort of sublimation, negatively interprets this
striving as “part vanity, part waste sexual emotion, part waste curiosity” (51; ch. 14). In this
characterization, only curiosity, a mental quality that can lead to purposeful and positive
action, relates to Lamarckism.
23. Wells arrived at the view that physical evolution, because of its slowness and because of the
modern maintenance of those with defects, was essentially at a standstill (see Early Writings
213–15). Combining this idea of arrested development with his identification of humans as
animals, Wells refers to man as the “culminating ape” (217).
594 VICTORIAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE
24. In his preface to the second volume of The Works (Atlantic Edition), Wells refers to the
novel as “a theological grotesque” entailing a “flaming caricature” of humanity — presum-
ably a reference to the Beast People (ix). Elsewhere he calls it “an exercise in youthful
blasphemy” (Wells’s Literary Criticism 243).
25. See The Island of Doctor Moreau, “Appendix 6. Wells in Defense of Moreau” (197–210), in
which Philmus covers this subject, incorporating Wells’s published reactions to the negative
reviews his book had received. In his responses Wells argues for the scientific plausibility of
Moreau’s experiments.
26. The essay derives from the first version of Doctor Moreau and its chapter, “Doctor Moreau
Explains” (Wells, Doctor Moreau 128–35).
27. According to Haynes, the disjunctive elements and inconsistencies of the novel allow it to
take on mythic resonance: “Despite the apparent realism of the novel — and the recoil of
Wells’s contemporaries from its vivid pictures of horror testifies to its atmosphere of authen-
ticity — Wells’s success in creating the sense of a mythical dimension in the novel resides in
its very ambiguities. The images do not reinforce each other, and the resultant blurred and
composite picture seems to bespeak a complexity all the more striking because of the clarity
of the details” (39–40).
28. The first version of The Island of Doctor Moreau makes little note of jungle vegetation. The
jungle, however, became indispensable to his revision as Wells discovered his theme of
mental entanglement in relation to evolutionary theory; this discovery is hinted at, I believe,
by his addition of the word “tangle” to the first page of the original, manuscript version of
the story (see n5 above).
29. Moreau voices or implies a number of ideas and attitudes that Wells advocates in his early
essays. These include the importance of vivisection, organic forms’ extreme “plasticity” or
malleability, the possibility of eliminating the need for pain, the definitive influence of
speech in the development of humanity, the insignificance of humankind from a cosmic
perspective, and moral relativism. Recognizing such convergence, a minority of critics have
interpreted the presentation of Moreau as largely or entirely positive. In the introduction to
his informative 1996 critical edition of The Island of Doctor Moreau, Stover adopts such a
position, reading Moreau as a Wellsian saint. A novel, however, is a work of imagination,
not a direct transcription of intellectual positions. My view is that the text expresses Wells’s
creative response to many desirable and undesirable possibilities summed up especially in
the confused ideas and behaviors of Moreau. He is as much a dysfunctional hybrid psycho-
logically as any of his creations is physically, and this is primarily why he fails. In particular
Moreau personifies contradictory evolutionary positions, including his author’s interest in
both Lamarckism and Darwinism, one an intellectual blind alley and the other a vital truth
with little to offer to human aspiration.
30. In two editions of the novel the phrase reads “the Leopard Man,” without the possessive
adjective (Wells, Doctor Moreau 54n[c]).
31. A response to such uncertainty is to try to fix one’s identity in relation to an Other defined
by qualities, generally negative ones, calculated to somehow inflate the self through com-
parison. Prendick attempts this maneuver, especially at the end when he most wants to avoid
identification with the degenerating Beast Folk, whom he now calls “Beast Monsters” in
some editions of the novel (Wells, Doctor Moreau 86n[h]). The susceptibility of Moreau’s
creatures to this treatment parallels that of natives to the constructions imposed upon them
by colonizers. In an her essay dealing with Doctor Moreau in terms of imperialism and
gender, Hendershot asserts that “the fact that Wells’s ‘savages’ are made by Moreau and not
found by him appears to be an explicit foregrounding of European perceptions of and
epistemological creation of natives rather than any statement about non-Europeans per se.
In other words, Wells moved toward a deconstruction of European perceptions of the
Evolution and Entanglement in H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau 595
Imperial Other” (6). This reading meshes with my position that the novel destabilizes any
number of conventional understandings about nature, humans, and human practices,
thereby involving itself, not in just a gloomy, unproductive recording of injustice and suffer-
ing, but in the positive project of pointing toward alternatives.
32. Not anesthetizing the animals he operates on does help keep him in power since it causes
the Beast People to associate him with pain and thus fear him greatly as a creator both
powerful and cruel.
33. See Wells, Doctor Moreau 105nn[c]–[e]; 138n5.
34. As with Gulliver, to whom he is often compared (for example, see Hammond), Prendick
ends up in a dubious condition. Upon his return to England he “gave such a strange account
of himself that he was supposed demented. Subsequently he alleged that his mind was a
blank from the moment of his escape from the Lady Vain” (3; Intro.). Prendick begins to
perceive his fellow humans as repulsive and dangerous beasts, consults a mental specialist,
and withdraws from society into solitude.
35. This quotation comes from Wells’s essay, “Human Evolution, an Artificial Process” (1896),
published the same year as The Island of Doctor Moreau. In it he argues that only “the
artificial factor,” accumulated knowledge disseminated through a selfless commitment to
wide-spread education, can free humanity to pursue, in a rational manner, the happiness of
itself and other forms of life. This factor is prominently absent from the novel.
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